

Spring 2007
Volume 2, Issue 1

Philosophy Matters -- Friends of Rutgers Philosophy

Still #2

The **Philosophical Gourmet** verdict is in and, yet again, the Rutgers philosophy department ranks second in the English speaking world (behind only NYU, and tied with Oxford). In the 2004 rankings, Rutgers also was tied for second. In 2002, the department tied for first (with NYU and Princeton). By now, there is no disputing that Philosophy ranks squarely among a small group of elite Rutgers programs.

Crunch the PGR data and several things are clear. First: the world's best philosophy is done in a 70 mile stretch of the New Jersey Turnpike, from Princeton (#3) to New York. This is the new Athens, the epicenter of leading philosophical thought.

The other reality: Rutgers just is extremely good in a lot of the areas that are considered core in today's philosophy. Rutgers rules in much of epistemology and metaphysics. Per Philosophical Gourmet raters, Rutgers scores in the top tier of programs in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Rutgers also ranks among the top programs in applied ethics and philosophy of social sciences. And the department is exhibiting strength in perhaps surprising areas such as 18th century philosophy (Locke, Leibniz, et al) and political philosophy, where Rutgers now ranks in the second tier of top programs.

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Hofstadter at RU

Pulitzer Prize winner Douglas Hofstadter – author of *Gödel, Escher and Bach* – will give this year's Class of 1970 Philosophy Lecture on Thursday, April 26th at 8:00pm. That book is believed by many to be seminal in helping to spur today's research into cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and allied fields.

On the faculty of Indiana University, Hofstadter is College Professor of Cognitive Science and Computer Science; Adjunct Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy, Psychological & Brain Sciences and Comparative Literature.

In keeping with the groundrules of the Class of 1970 Philosophy Lecture, Prof. Hofstadter was selected by a group of undergraduate philosophy majors.

In Spring 2006, the initial Class of 1970 Philosophy Lecture was given by Tufts professor Daniel Dennett, who appeared in front of a standing-room only crowd in Winants Hall.

For Hofstadter's presentation, invitations are extended to undergraduates and graduate students but also to alumni and other friends of Rutgers Philosophy.

The Hofstadter lecture will again be in Winants Hall, 7 College Avenue. Get there early because another SRO crowd is expected.

See the colorful Hofstadter poster: www.rutgers70.org/Hofstadter.pdf
It's an eye-popping piece of creativity.

Stich Wins Major Honor

Longtime faculty member Stephen Stich recently was honored with receiving the Jean-Nicod Prize for 2007, an award organized by the Centre National de la Recherche Supérieure to help promote cognitive sciences in France. Stich, who joined the Rutgers faculty in 1989, is widely recognized as a cognitive sciences pioneer. Past Jean-Nicod Prize winners include Rutgers' Jerry Fodor, who was honored with the inaugural award in 1993, and psychologist Zenon Plyshyn (2004). Other winners include Donald Davidson (1995), John Searle (2000), Daniel Dennett (2001), and Gilbert Harman (2005).

Old News

Read the inaugural Rutgers Philosophy newsletter by going to: <http://www.mcgarvey.net/Friends-Rutgers2006.pdf>. There is lots of good info, including comments on mind reading by Prof Stich and Prof. Goldman.

What's New in the Undergraduate Program –

A Report by Frances Egan, Director of Undergraduate Studies



In the past year there have been some exciting developments in the undergraduate philosophy curriculum. New courses added to the catalog include philosophy of biology, history of analytic philosophy, and social epistemology. A course in the philosophy of literature will be offered for the first time next spring.

The philosophy writing tutorial, introduced last spring, is offered again this semester. It is primarily for juniors who are eligible for honors in philosophy. Students work together in a small group, under the supervision of two graduate students, to revise papers previously submitted for a 300 or 400 level philosophy course. Those intending to go on to graduate school can use the paper as the writing sample component of the application. More generally, the tutorial provides students with the opportunity to discuss their work with their peers, and to improve their papers in response to constructive criticism. Students are encouraged to submit their revised papers to an undergraduate journal or conference. The department has set aside funds to defray travel expenses for students whose papers are accepted at out-of-town conferences.

The advanced seminar in ethics, introduced in fall 2005, is currently underway, again taught by Larry Temkin and our distinguished visitor, Derek Parfit, Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. The class is made up of our best junior and senior philosophy majors. They have been reading book manuscripts by Temkin and Parfit on various topics in ethics. Temkin and Parfit are scheduled to teach the seminar every other spring semester.

Thirty-five students are expected to graduate with honors in philosophy this year, up ten per cent from last year. We will again be holding a reception in the department for our honors graduates, providing grads and their parents with an opportunity to socialize with philosophy faculty. Everyone involved enjoyed last year's inaugural event.

On the extra-curricular front, the philosophy club has been very active this year, under the direction of our undergraduate administrator, Mercedes Diaz. Several of our graduate students have given talks to the club, on topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics.

The club has sponsored excursions to lectures and conferences at Princeton and NYU, and to the off-Broadway play *Outing Wittgenstein*.

The six seniors on the RU Class of 1970 speaker's committee conferred over a series of meetings in the fall and selected Douglas Hofstadter, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science at Indiana University, as this year's speaker. The committee will be rewarded for their hard work with a private dinner with Hofstadter at the Rutgers Club before the lecture. The lecture is sponsored by the RU Class of 1970, with additional support from the philosophy department and the Office of the Vice-President for Undergraduate Education.

The Rutgers chapter of *Phi Sigma Tau*, the national philosophy honors society, is up and running, thanks to current chapter president, philosophy senior Greg McKelvey, and faculty advisor Ruth Chang. The chapter has about 20 active members, and will be meeting soon to elect next year's executive.

News from the Graduate Program –

A Report by Dean W. Zimmerman, Vice Chair and Director of Graduate Studies

This year, we received 284 applications to our graduate program — the largest number anyone can remember, and about 80 more applicants than in 2006. Rutgers has begun offering Presidential Fellowships to some of the strongest applicants to its graduate programs, and we have been able to offer two of these, which carry a larger stipend during the fellowship years (when students are not serving as teaching assistants or teaching fellows). One of those students has accepted her fellowship, the other is undecided as of this writing. An incoming class of 9 or 10 graduate students is expected.

Almost all our graduate students on the job market have found employment. There were 12 students looking for work. Eight will begin tenure-track jobs (or a regular faculty position in the U.K. — where the tenure system doesn't apply, exactly). One of these students had job offers from Pitt, Harvard, UCLA, Berkeley, and Princeton. The other six are going to Oxford University, Northern Illinois University, Western Washington University, UMass-Amherst, Purdue, Central Washington, and St. Joseph's. Two other students had tenure-track offers but elected to accept post-docs at Cornell and UMass-Amherst. The two remaining students who did not land jobs this year will continue to work on their dissertations next year and try again.

Notes from the Friends of Rutgers Philosophy

Last year's inaugural newsletter triggered many emails from readers, some of whom reported on their current doings. A sampling follows. Sarah-Jane Leslie (Class of 2002) won a PhD in philosophy at Princeton and now is on the Princeton faculty....Fritz J. Weaver (RC 1998) reports that he is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at SUNY New Paltz. He was awarded a PhD by CUNY in 2006....Michael D. Redmond, a 1979 grad, is now a professor of philosophy at Bergen Community College; he got his PhD from Drew in 1985...Merrie Bergmann (DC 1972) is an associate professor of computer science at Smith...Andrew J. Dell'Olio (RC 1981) is an associate professor of philosophy at Hope College in Michigan....Philip Bennett (RC 1964) went on to get a PhD in philosophy from NYU, and continues to teach philosophy (currently at Fairfield University in CT)...Tobyn C. DeMarco (1989 grad) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Bergen Community College in New Jersey...David Lubar (1976 grad) writes that he earns his living as a writer; find out more at www.davidlubar.com.... Anthony D'Agostino (RC 2002) is enrolled in a Master's of Public Policy program at the National University of Singapore... Christopher Michael Jones (2004 grad) is enrolled at Princeton Theological Seminary.

Want to tell other alums what you doing? Send a quick email to the newsletter editor and we'll get you in next year's round up: rjm@mcgarvey.net.

Hiring Hall

One of the most telling measures of a philosophy program is where its Ph.D. graduates teach, and Rutgers fares increasingly well in that regard. Big news is that Jonathan Schaffer (PhD, 1999), who had been on the faculty at UMass, has accepted a permanent research position at the Australian National University.

PhD recipients in 2006 now are at Haverford College (Gary Bartlett), University of Kansas (Kevin Edwards), NYU (Christopher Meacham, post doc), UC-Davis (Bernard Molyneux, also Adam Sennett), Arizona State (Angel Pinillos), Univ of Southern California (Jacob Ross), Cal State Northridge (Adam Swenson), and Univ of Toronto (Jonathan Weiberg).

Early news about prospective 2007 PhDs include Hilary Greaves securing a junior research fellowship at Merton College, Oxford; Dennis Whitcomb going to Western Washington Univ.; Valia Allori accepted an offer from Northern Illinois; and Daniel Kelly will teach at Purdue.

Prof. Ernie Lepore reports that graduate student Sam Cummings (PhD expected in May 2007) has won job offers from Princeton, Harvard, Pittsburgh, UCLA, and Berkeley – an extraordinary showing.

Additional appointments will be announced as offers are made.

Meet Peter Klein -- A Conversation with Patrick McKnight (Class of 2007)



Professor Peter Klein, an epistemologist by preference, is recognized as a key player in shaping the Rutgers Philosophy into the renowned department it is today. I recently asked him what got him interested in philosophy as a career in the first place.

“I took a course as a sophomore [at Earlham College in Indiana] in which we read Descartes's *Meditations*. I was hooked after reading the ‘First Meditation’ – the one that introduced the evil genius,” he explained.” When I found out that I could earn a living teaching and doing research in philosophy, there was no other life possibility that was even a close competitor. Skepticism is still a central interest of mine.”

What are you primarily working on now?

“I'm working on the so-called epistemic regress problem. It's an old problem. Plato and Aristotle dealt with it explicitly, but it is probably best known from the writings of the skeptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus (end of the second century). Roughly, it can be put like this: We often seem epistemically required to have reasons for our beliefs because lacking them makes the belief arbitrary (even if it happens to be true). Another way of putting that is simply that to believe something on no grounds whatsoever seems dogmatic. Answering the child's question "why" with "because I said so" looks like bullying. Finally, another way of trying to capture the intuition here is that a person who has a reason for some belief, say *p*, is, *ceteris paribus*, in a better epistemic position than a person who has no reason for believing that *p*. But that seems to lead to a regress of reasons. So, the question becomes this: Is there ever some point where it is epistemically permissible to stop looking for reasons?

Foundationalists say that there is some proper stopping point and typically argue for their view by attempting to show that the other two logically possible responses, coherentism and infinitism, are incorrect. I think it is fair to say that foundationalism of one form or another has been the dominant view since Aristotle. I argue that infinitism is the correct view. Roughly the view is this: It is never the case that there is a point in the regress which is such that seeking a further reason cannot become required.

The argument for this rests on two more basic claims. 1) For some subject, *S*, to be fully justified in believing a proposition, *S* has to justify it. That is, we contribute to the epistemic-good making features of a belief by providing reasons. 2) It is always proper to

ask a foundationalist, S, who takes beliefs to be foundational because they possess some feature, say F, whether he/she is a good detector of F and whether he/she detected F. (Let F be anything you like: first person psychological reports, contextually determined regress stopping beliefs, beliefs with a certain etiology, etc.) Now, either S believes that (he/she is a good detector of F and he/she detected F) or S doesn't. Now, consider two foundationalists: S and S*. If S believes the conjunction and S* does not, then S is in a significantly better epistemic position than S*. Hence, S's belief is epistemically better than S*'s. So, there appears to be no way to stop the regress if one is a self-conscious, epistemically responsible foundationalist.

There are also the standard objections to infinitism to overcome. The most interesting is this one: We have finite minds, so how we could have an infinite number of beliefs and how could we engage in producing an infinite number of reasons? First, finite minds can have an infinite number of beliefs, if that merely implies that we are always able to produce another reason. Nothing more than that is required by infinitism. We don't have to actually have formed an infinite number of beliefs at any given time. Second, producing one reason in the chain, say r, for the belief that p makes p partially justified. Producing a reason for r, makes r partially justified and p even more justified. So, actually producing an infinite number of beliefs is not required for a belief to be justified to some extent - perhaps even to the extent necessary to accept it.”

Anyone interested in looking at this issue further could go to:

<http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/ojs/viewissue.php?id=4&locale=en>

In the years you've been at Rutgers, in what ways has the department changed? What changes would you still like to see?

“We have become one of the world's leading departments. My colleagues are terrific; our graduate students are terrific, and our undergraduate majors are terrific. Teaching has remained fun for me, but our class sizes have increased over the years to such an extent that it makes it somewhat more difficult for professors and students to engage in active teaching and learning. I think nothing can substitute for small classes with twenty or so students. But the reduction in state funding has made that increasingly difficult to provide to students on a regular basis. We need our alumni to become active lobbyists for higher education in NJ. There are many needs – better health care provided to all of our citizens, better K-12 education, more research into alternative energy sources, etc. But successfully addressing all of those depends upon enhancing higher education in all disciplines.”

Contributed by Patrick McKnight (Livingston College, Class of 2007).

Editor's note: For the past year, Prof. Klein has served Rutgers as acting executive vice dean of the School of Arts and Sciences. He plans to return to fulltime service in the Philosophy Dept. as soon as he fulfills his commitment to SAS.

Meet Martha Bolton – A Conversation with Lauren Litus (Class of 2007)



As one of the department's longest tenured members, Martha Bolton has personally watched the department transform into one of the nation's most distinguished philosophy departments. She says that it's an exciting department to be part of.

What are you primarily working on now?

"I am currently working on topics in Locke, Leibniz, and their successors. More specifically, I am focusing on their theories of representation and cognition on one hand and their epistemology on the other. For example, many people reading Locke have confused his doctrine of intentionality and his warrant for knowledge. His theory of ideas is a theory of intentionality, whereas other people have thought it is about epistemological warrant."

Why is this important?

"First of all, it is interesting to know what the early modern philosophers have said about these problems. Some of these problems still occupy us to this day. They explain the problems that puzzle us in less technical terms. It's also interesting to see the issues in the context of the early modern period. Furthermore, by looking back, you can get ideas of how to approach contemporary issues."

What got you interested in philosophy as a career in the first place?

"It was actually an accident. I was a pre-med major. I didn't take a philosophy class until my senior year. What got me interested was the arguments. Specifically, how progress could be made without a lab. For example, how you could see that some arguments are better than others just on the basis of the arguments."

What philosopher can't you get enough of?

"Two of my favorite historical philosophers are Leibniz and Locke. I like Locke because he thinks along the same lines as me. His work is natural and easy to think about and it is easy to see where he goes right. I like Leibniz simply because of the sheer

intelligence of the man. His intellectual power gets him to some extremely fundamental and important results. He simply has a good grip on philosophical issues. A more contemporary figure I like is Kripke.”

What have you learned from the students you've taught?

“Students have pointed out things outside of class that pertain to issues in the class, such as movies and books, and I'll go check them out. When I teach, it is interesting to see how the students approach the topics and the different points of view. I learn a lot when I think of how to explain something in a way that will be intelligible to the students.”

In the 30+ years you've been at Rutgers, in what ways has the department changed that you never would have envisioned?

“I couldn't have anticipated the stature of the faculty. I had ambitions but I never thought Rutgers would excel to the extent that it has. When I first came here, there had only been a graduate program for a few years.”

What changes would you like to see in the future?

“I would like to see more women on the faculty. I would also like to see the department moved to the College Avenue Campus. By being on Douglass Campus, we're isolated. It takes away from the life of the department and the education of the undergraduates. By being on College Avenue, we would have more of a presence within the university.”

Contributed by Lauren Litus (Rutgers College, Class of 2007)

MORE THAN FOOTBALL

Rutgers excels at more than philosophy and football. Other top programs include mathematics, history, English, computer sciences and many more. A recent issue of the university's internal magazine FOCUS looked at areas where Rutgers excels. Get the full story here: <http://news.rutgers.edu/focus/issue.2006-11-22.9692720812/article.2006-11-29.1644284301>

Meet Alan Code – A Conversation With Dan Burnston (Class of 2007)

Alan Code is one of the newest members of the faculty. This fall he will move to Rutgers, after many years at UC Berkeley, where he gained a national reputation as a leader scholar in Greek philosophy. Here, he provides a preview of how his mind works.

What are you working on right now?

The main topic I am thinking about these days is Aristotle's concept of causality in scientific explanation, and in particular issues stemming from his idea that natural science deals not only with exceptionless regularities but also with what happens 'for the most part.' The best way to explain why I am working on it is just to say more about what it involves, and show how goes to the heart of some deeply puzzling features of the physical world.

He adopts what I consider the eminently reasonable view that the natural world is an interconnected whole, though the different branches of science are each confined to one kind of phenomena. A particular science such as non-organic chemistry has its own independent principles, but chemistry doesn't study everything that happens to collections and mixtures of chemicals. Meteorological phenomena are in a way just complicated chemical systems, and what happens to the chemicals in those systems does not violate principles of chemistry. However, Aristotle thought that although chemistry can explain how different types of fluids are produced, and how their chemical properties depend upon what they are made, more than just principles of chemistry are required to account for the weather. Seasonal variations in temperature and humidity are cyclical variations in distributions of chemical processes, but from the perspective of chemistry they are nonetheless 'accidental'.

"He was working in a tradition of natural philosophy that made the very modern sounding assumption that everything is ultimately composed of basic elementary particulars (either as discrete atoms, or uniform and lacking intrinsic geometrical structure), and whatever we observe is the result of various processes such as compression and expansion of aggregates or mixtures of elementary constituents. For instance, Empedocles took the basic forces, responsible among other things for compression/expansions, to be an attractive force ('Love') and a repulsive force "Strife").

"For Aristotle the rotation of the universe, and the associated seasonal variations in fluidity and warmth in our atmosphere as well as on and beneath the terrestrial surface, is not due chemical composition. As in contemporary science, the behavior of winds and circulating fluids cannot be derived from principles of chemistry.

"I am interested in what he has to say about this not just because he said it, but because of what might be learned about causality and science. The search for principles in ancient Greek science assumed that everything is composed of particles, but did not

assume that everything that happens is explicable in terms of what goes on at that level. Macro-systems of elementary constituents (such as the weather) exhibit behaviors that are due to external sources, and in addition for Aristotle there are internal sources of change at the level of self-regulating systems. This latter group includes both living organisms and celestial motions. His own views are famously at odds with an evolutionary approach to the determination of the nature self-maintaining systems, but this was not a fixed feature of the natural philosophy of his time. We may usefully abstract from his view of the eternity of both the heavens and the species of living things to consider in a more general way what, for instance, in the patterns involved in the 'life cycle' of a star is explicable in terms of gravitational collapse and what is due to quantum behavior. Stars are balls of extremely heated gases composed of elements subject to nuclear and photoelectric forces as well as to internal and external gravitational influences, but in the absence of quantum theory of gravity their life-cycles cannot be derived from what happens at the micro-level.

Who are your major philosophical influences and what is it about their work that you enjoy?

"I read pretty widely, and am influenced by and interested in questions and methods more than by specific individuals or personalities. For instance, since I am thinking about causality in Aristotle's philosophy of science, I'm also reading all sorts of 'contemporary' literature on the topic as well. For instance, right now I am reading David Bohm's *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics*. It would be going too far to single him out as one of my 'influences'. Just before this I read (or rather reread) Hans Reichenbach's *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, and J.S. Bell's 'Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists' (in *Speakable and Unsayable in Quantum Mechanics*). I don't work in the technical side of philosophy of physics, but these are people who deal with the kinds of general issues I am now working on in connection with Aristotle, and this inevitably leads me to this kind of literature.

"Philosophy is a difficult and complex undertaking, and in my opinion is most fruitfully pursued as part of a community."

Contributed by Dan Burnston (Livingston College, Class of 2007)

Give to Rutgers Philosophy

Small gifts add up and, nowadays, giving to the Rutgers Philosophy Dept. is as easy as going online. Just click into the Rutgers Foundation:

<https://secure.entango.com/donate/GSuEdXhgRpV>

Scroll down to "Choose an academic department." Highlight philosophy. That's it.

What happens with this money? Gifts in recent years have helped provide stipends so that graduate students can attend professional conferences, monies have been used to purchase subscriptions to trade journals, and of course for specialized books.

Remember this: New Jersey's public support for Rutgers has been diminishing and that puts the burden on alumni and other friends to help fill the funding gap.

Whether \$10 or \$10,000 or more, gifts to the department help improve the quality of academic life for students, both undergraduates and graduates.

Roll of Thanks...

Many donors have helped the Philosophy Department reach its present level of excellence. Among those who have helped financially in the past year are:

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The Philosophy Department extends its sincere thanks for all support received.

Want to see your name here? Just make a gift to Rutgers, designating that the funds go to the Philosophy Department. Start here: <http://support.rutgers.edu/index.shtml>

Rutgers Faculty Publication List 2005-present

Why does the Rutgers philosophy faculty consistently rank among the world's best? A key reason is that this is a prolific faculty; its members publish widely and often, on topics that are central to today's philosophical debates. Proof of that is found in a bibliography of recent faculty publications, provided to this newsletter by grad student Angela Harper. She has produced a terrific resource for students and others who want to read more by their favorite Rutgers philosophers, and perhaps this document also will serve as fuel for debates about which Rutgers philosopher is the most widely published.

1. Anne Ashbaugh ashbaugh@rci.rutgers.edu

Mujeres ensayistas del Caribe Hispánico: Hilvanando el silencio, With Lourdes Rojas, Verbum, Madrid, April 2007.

(My portion of the book selects and discusses informal philosophies in the works of Puerto Rican essayists).

2. Martha Bolton mbolton@rci.rutgers.edu

“Leibniz and the Limits of Perception” *Einheit in der Vielheit*, ed. Hans Posner (Berlin: 2006).

The paper is about Leibniz's account of perception and its metaphysical consequences. It argues that on his account, perception is a non-conceptual form of representation—iconic and with intentional content strictly limited to things structured as spatial-temporal parts and wholes. By contrast, propositional, or conceptual, representation, is of an entirely different type, found only in humans and other rational beings. The latter is capable of representing perceptual content (in propositional form), but also capable of representing partless entities, one's self, the substance-property relation, logical connections, and so on. This has far-reaching implications in regard to Leibniz's account of the various types of cognition and their respective roles in mental operation (I'm currently working on this). But in this paper, I use it to explicate Leibniz's metaphysical doctrines of universal expression and universal perception.

“Leibniz’s *Nouveaux Essais: a Contest by Dialogue*”, in *Leibniz and the English Speaking World*, ed. Pauline Phemister and Stuart Brown (Berlin: Springer, 2007).

Leibniz’s study of Locke’s *Essay* is a dialogue, but not of any familiar sort. Many authors conclude that it’s a superficial device without philosophical consequences. Working from Leibniz’s many papers on techniques for resolving controversies and productively conducting debate on difficult questions, I argue that the dialogue is conducted by informal rules that are capable of deciding between competing views on a disputed issue. The paper argues that certain rules that can be found in Leibniz’s work on theory of discourse govern the dialogue and generate the philosophical results the speakers report in the work.

“Berkeley and Mental Representation: Why Not a Lockean Theory of Ideas?” in *New Interpretations of Berkeley’s Philosophy*, ed. Stephen H. Daniel (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, in press).

This paper contrasts Berkeley’s contention, that ideas are the sensible objects we know, with Locke’s theory, that ideas represent the sensible objects we know. Why does Berkeley reject his predecessor’s view? The paper argues, in detail, that Berkeley provides no argument—neither a metaphysical one nor an epistemic (anti-skeptical) one—for his theory of ideas. It concludes that Berkeley’s objection to the representative theory has to do with Locke’s account of the semantic connection between ideas and external objects, which does seem to imply that humans have some sort of innate cognitive dispositions. Berkeley appears to be more radically opposed to nativism than his empiricist predecessor, Locke.

3. Martin Bunzl bunzl@rci.rutgers.edu

One of the editors on issues in the ethics and economics of slave redemption (to be published by Princeton University Press 2007), and as one of the editors on methodological challenges in current imaging research (under contract to MIT Press.)

4. Ruth Chang changr@rci.rutgers.edu

“Parity, Interval Value, and Choice”, 114 *Ethics* January 2005.

5. Frances Egan fegan@rci.rutgers.edu

“Representation in Language and Mind,” in *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2nd edition), K. Brown, ed., Elsevier, 2005.

“Mentalese,” in *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2nd edition), K. Brown, ed., Elsevier, 2005.

“Computationalism,” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2nd edition), D. Bochart, ed., Macmillan, 2006.

Review of Christopher Hill’s *Thought and World*, in *Mind* 115 (2006), 152-156.

“Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way,” *Synthese* 153 (2006), 377-91.
(Co-authored with R. J. Matthews.)

“Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?” forthcoming in *Stich and His Critics*, M. Bishop and D. Murphy, eds., Blackwell’s.

“Wide Content,” forthcoming in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, A. Beckerman and B. McLaughlin, eds., Oxford University Press.

“The Content of Color Experience,” forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

“Representationalism,” forthcoming in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science*, E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich, eds., Oxford University Press.

6. Jerry Fodor fodor@ruccs.rutgers.edu

(2005) Review of David Buller ADAPTING MINDS, TLS #5339, 29 July, pp 3-5.

(2006) "What is universally quantified and necessary and a posteriori and it flies south in the winter?" APA Presidential Address, Proceedings and addresses of the APA, Vol. 80:2, pp 11-24.

7. Alvin Goldman goldman@philosophy.rutgers.edu

Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading was published in 2006, by Oxford University Press.

I assumed the editorship of the journal EPISTEME, A JOURNAL OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY. To get information about the journal (if you wish), you can consult its website: <http://www.episteme.us.com>

“Legal Evidence,” in M. Golding and W. Edmundson, eds., *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory* (pp. 163-175). Blackwell Publishing (2005).

“Imitation, Mind Reading, and Simulation,” in S. Hurley and N. Chater, eds., *Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science*, vol. 2 (pp. 79-93). MIT

Press (2005).

“Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition” (with Chandra Sripada), *Cognition* 94:193-213 (2005).

“Disagreement in Philosophy,” in H. Battaly and M. Lynch, eds., *Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston* (pp. 121-135). Rowman & Littlefield (2005).

“Mirror Systems, Social Understanding, and Social Cognition” (plus 10-12 responses to commentaries). In *What Do Mirror Neurons Mean? Theoretical Implications of the Discovery of Mirror Neurons*, G. Origgi and D. Sperber, moderators, a virtual workshop sponsored by the European Science Foundation. <http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror> (2005).

“Simulation, mirroring, and a different argument from error” (letter) (with Natalie Sebanz). *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 9: 320 (2005).

“Simulation and the Evolution of Mindreading” (with Chandra Sripada), in Antonio Zilhao, ed., *Evolution, Rationality and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century*. Routledge (2005).

“The Simulation Theory,” in D. Borchert, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition, Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA (2006).

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Also, I was Philosophy of Science editor for *The MacMillan Encyclopedia of
Philosophy* and did entries on Philosophy of physics and a few others.

14. Robert Matthews rjm@rci.rutgers.edu

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20. Derek Parfit

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22. Ernest Sosa

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2005

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Defends a conception of dreams on which *I think therefore I am awake* has about as good an epistemic standing as *I think therefore I am*.

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Human testimony stands with the senses in providing default rational justification. And the same goes for the instrumental knowledge that gives us access to testimony through the instrument of language. The instrument of one's language is among those that we master through sub-personal means involving animal processes below the level of any kind of reasoning. And yet the instrumental knowledge that it enables is an essential link in the chain whereby we come to know much of what we know, whereby we attain our knowledge at its best, and at its most rational.

2007

A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume One (Oxford University Press).

Published now very nearly as delivered, these lectures argue for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Skeptics would deny us any such accomplishment, and the account of knowledge here is framed by confrontations with the two skeptics that I find most compelling. A lecture on dream skepticism begins the volume, and one on the problem of the criterion ends it. The core positive account of knowledge is presented in the second lecture and developed further in the fifth. These two lectures detail how the account solves the problem of external world skepticism, and the sixth how it solves the problem of the criterion. In the middle lectures the account is used to illuminate two central issues of epistemology: intuitions and their place in philosophy, in the third; and the nature of epistemic normativity, in the fourth. My overall aim is to present a kind of virtue epistemology in line with a tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, and especially Descartes (though none of these advocates it in all its parts), and to shine its light on varieties of skepticism, on the nature and status of intuitions, and on epistemic normativity.

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Language in Context: Selected Essays (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007).

This is a collection of most of my papers on context-sensitivity in natural language (essays 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, and 19), together with a 14,000 word introduction and a 5,000 word postscript.

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Clark-Way-Harrison Distinguished Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, January – April 2007.

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Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, Kevin J. Haley, Serena Eng & Daniel M. T. Fessler, "Harm, Affect and the Moral / Conventional Distinction," to appear in *Mind and Language*.

Kelby Mason, Stephen Stich & Frank Jackson, "Implicit Knowledge and Folk Psychology," to appear in Robert Nola & David Braddon-Mitchell. eds., *The Canberra Plan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich, "Two Theories About the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality," to appear in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich, eds., *Innateness and the Structure of the Mind, Vol. III, Foundations and the Future* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Stephen Stich, John Doris & Erica Roedder, "Egoism vs. Altruism," to appear in *Rethinking Moral Psychology: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Ethics and the Human Sciences ed. by the Moral Psychology Research Group* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich, "Moral Judgment," to appear in the *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology*, ed. by John Symons & Paco Calvo.

Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, "Against Arguments From Reference" to appear in David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman, eds., *Metametaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Stephen Stich, "Some Questions About the Evolution of Morality," to appear in *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research*.

25. Larry Temkin

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"Larry S. Temkin," in Political Questions: 5 Questions on Political Theory, edited by Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen, pp. 147-167, Automatic Press/VIP, 2006.

"Political Questions is a collection of original contributions from a distinguished score of the world's most prominent and influential political philosophers. They deal with questions such as what drew them towards the area; how they view their own contributions to the field; and what the future of political philosophy looks like." Besides Rutgers's own Larry Temkin, other contributors to the volume include Kwame Anthony Appia (Princeton), Amy Gutmann (President, University of Pennsylvania), Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago), Philip Pettit (Australian National University and Princeton), John Roemer (Yale), and Michael Walzer (Institute for Advanced Study).

"Equality, Moral and Social [addendum]," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, volume 3, second edition, edited by Donald M. Borchert, pp. 334-337, Macmillan Reference USA, 2005.

"A 'New' Principle of Aggregation," Philosophical Issues, 15, Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 218-234, 2005.

"Welfare, Poverty, and the Needy: A Pluralistic Approach," in Philosophie und/als Wissenschaft (Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy: Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5), edited by Nimtz, Christian and Beckermann, Ansgar, pp. 147-63, Paderborn, Germany, Mentis Press, 2005.

26. Dean Zimmerman

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I edited Vol. 1 of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, and it included this:

“Prologue: Metaphysics After the 20th Century”, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. ix-xxiv

In 2006, Vol. 2 of OSM appeared, and Vol. 3 will come out this Spring.

I wrote a paper back in the 90s called "Temporary Intrinsic and Presentism", and last year it was reprinted (along with another paper of mine) in a book called "Persistence" (details below). Along with the reprinting, there was a newly written postscript, much longer than the original article, called:

“Can One ‘Take Tense Seriously’ and Be a B-theorist?” (a postscript to “Temporary Intrinsic and Presentism”), in Persistence, ed. by Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie Kurtz (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., 2006), pp. 404-424

This month, another book I edited (with Peter van Inwagen) came out, and it included this:

“Three Introductory Questions: Is Analytic Philosophical Theology an Oxymoron? Is Substance Dualism Incoherent? What’s in this Book, Anyway?”, in Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds), *Persons: Human and Divine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 1-32

Later this year, there will be this:

“The Privileged Present: Defending an ‘A-theory’ of Time”, in *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, ed. by Ted Sider, Dean W. Zimmerman, and John Hawthorne (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, forthcoming, 2007)

Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition (MacMillan, 2006).

The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'
Dialectica 59(4), 2005, pp. 401-457.

Temporary Intrinsic and Presentism (with Postscript)
Haslanger, Sally and Kurtz, Roxanne Marie (eds.), *Persistence* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).

The Privileged Present: Defending an 'A-Theory' of Time
Ted Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, forthcoming).

“Dispatches from the Zombie Wars,” *The Times Literary Supplement*, April 28, 2006

Compiled by Angela Harper, a graduate student in philosophy at Rutgers.

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